16
REFERENCES
Adlakha, S., Johari, R., &Goldsmith, A. (2007).
Competition in wireless systems via Bayesian interfer-
ence games. arXiv preprint arXiv:0709.0516.
Ahuja, K., Hassan, M. H., &Hossain, M. J. (2014,
April). To participate or not in spectrum auctions with
entry fee: Bayesian game theoretic approach. In 2014
IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking
Conference (WCNC) (pp. 1614–1619). IEEE.
Amann, E., &Leininger, W. (1996). Asymmetric all-pay
auctions with incomplete information: the two-player
case. Games and economic behavior, 14(1), 1–18.
Antle, J. M. (2010). Do Economic Variables Follow Scale
or Location‐Scale Distributions?. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 92(1), 196–204.
Athey, S., &Cramton, P. (2005). Competitive Auction
Markets in British Columbia. Market Design Inc.
Atiningsih, S., &Izzaty, K. N. (2021). The effect firm
size on company value with profitability as interven-
ing variable and dividend policy as moderating vari-
able. International Journal of Economics, Business and
Accounting Research (IJEBAR), 5(4).
Auh, S., &Menguc, B. (2005). Balancing exploration and
exploitation: The moderating role of competitive inten-
sity. Journal of business research, 58(12), 1652–1661.
Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive
advantage. Journal of management, 17(1), 99–120.
Becker, G. S. (1962). Irrational behavior and economic
theory. Journal of political economy, 70(1), 1–13.
Bhattacharya, S., &Tiwari, R. (2014). Non-Coking Coal
Pricing in India. Economic and Political Weekly,
20–22.
Bowman, C., &Ambrosini, V. (2003). How the resource‐
based and the dynamic capability views of the firm
inform corporate‐level strategy. British journal of man-
agement, 14(4), 289–303.
Brahma, S. S., &Chakraborty, H. (2011). From industry
to firm resources: Resource-based view of competitive
advantage. The IUP Journal of Business Strategy, 8(2),
7–21.
Bujang, M. A., Omar, E. D., &Baharum, N. A. (2018).
A review on sample size determination for Cronbach’s
alpha test: a simple guide for researchers. The Malaysian
journal of medical sciences: MJMS, 25(6), 85.
Burguet, R. and Sakovics, J. (1999). “Imperfect compe-
tition in auction design.” International Economic
Review, 40(1):231–247.
CAG (2016). Report no. 20 of 2016, Chapter 2, Comptroller
&Auditor General of India. P.4 https://cag.gov.in
/uploads/download_audit_report/2016/Chapter_2
_of_eAuction_of_Coal_Mines_Compliance_Audit
.pdf.
Ceptureanu, S. I. (2016). Sources and factors in ensuring
the competitive advantage of the company. Quality-
Access to Success, 17(154), 110.
Chandra, R. (2018). Adaptive state capitalism in the
Indian coal industry (Doctoral dissertation, Harvard
University).
Chatterjee, K., &Harrison, T. P. (1988). The value of
information in competitive bidding. European journal
of operational research, 36(3), 322–333.
Che, Y.K. and Gale I.,(1996) ìExpected Revenue of All-
Pay Auctions and FirstPrice Sealed Bid Auctions
with Budget Constraints,îEconomics Letters, 50,
p. 373–379.
Cohn, A., Fehr, E., &Göette, L. (2015). Fair wages and
effort provision: combining evidence from a choice
experiment and a field experiment. Management
Science, 61(8), 1777–1794.
Collis, D. J. (1998). Understanding Sustainable Competitive
Advantage: The Role of Positioning, Resources and
Organisational Capabilities (No. ysm43). Yale School
of Management.
Compiani, G., Haile, P., &Sant’Anna, M. (2020). Common
values, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogenous
entry in US offshore oil lease auctions. Journal of
Political Economy, 128(10), 3872–3912.
Covert, T. R., &Sweeney, R. L. (2023). Relinquishing
Riches: Auctions versus Informal Negotiations in
Texas Oil and Gas Leasing. American Economic
Review, 113(3), 628–663.
Cox, J. C., Dinkin, S. H., &Smith, V. L. (1999). The win-
ner’s curse and public information in common value
auctions: comment. American Economic Review,
89(1), 319–324.
Cramton, P. (2009). Innovation and market
design. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 9(1),
113–137.
Cramton, P. (2010). How best to auction natural resources.
In The taxation of petroleum and minerals (pp. 305–
332). Routledge.
Crémer, J., &McLean, R. P. (1988). Full extraction of
the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auc-
tions. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society, 1247–1257.
Croasmun, J. T., &Ostrom, L. (2011). Using likert-type
scales in the social sciences. Journal of adult educa-
tion, 40(1), 19–22.
REFERENCES
Adlakha, S., Johari, R., &Goldsmith, A. (2007).
Competition in wireless systems via Bayesian interfer-
ence games. arXiv preprint arXiv:0709.0516.
Ahuja, K., Hassan, M. H., &Hossain, M. J. (2014,
April). To participate or not in spectrum auctions with
entry fee: Bayesian game theoretic approach. In 2014
IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking
Conference (WCNC) (pp. 1614–1619). IEEE.
Amann, E., &Leininger, W. (1996). Asymmetric all-pay
auctions with incomplete information: the two-player
case. Games and economic behavior, 14(1), 1–18.
Antle, J. M. (2010). Do Economic Variables Follow Scale
or Location‐Scale Distributions?. American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 92(1), 196–204.
Athey, S., &Cramton, P. (2005). Competitive Auction
Markets in British Columbia. Market Design Inc.
Atiningsih, S., &Izzaty, K. N. (2021). The effect firm
size on company value with profitability as interven-
ing variable and dividend policy as moderating vari-
able. International Journal of Economics, Business and
Accounting Research (IJEBAR), 5(4).
Auh, S., &Menguc, B. (2005). Balancing exploration and
exploitation: The moderating role of competitive inten-
sity. Journal of business research, 58(12), 1652–1661.
Barney, J. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive
advantage. Journal of management, 17(1), 99–120.
Becker, G. S. (1962). Irrational behavior and economic
theory. Journal of political economy, 70(1), 1–13.
Bhattacharya, S., &Tiwari, R. (2014). Non-Coking Coal
Pricing in India. Economic and Political Weekly,
20–22.
Bowman, C., &Ambrosini, V. (2003). How the resource‐
based and the dynamic capability views of the firm
inform corporate‐level strategy. British journal of man-
agement, 14(4), 289–303.
Brahma, S. S., &Chakraborty, H. (2011). From industry
to firm resources: Resource-based view of competitive
advantage. The IUP Journal of Business Strategy, 8(2),
7–21.
Bujang, M. A., Omar, E. D., &Baharum, N. A. (2018).
A review on sample size determination for Cronbach’s
alpha test: a simple guide for researchers. The Malaysian
journal of medical sciences: MJMS, 25(6), 85.
Burguet, R. and Sakovics, J. (1999). “Imperfect compe-
tition in auction design.” International Economic
Review, 40(1):231–247.
CAG (2016). Report no. 20 of 2016, Chapter 2, Comptroller
&Auditor General of India. P.4 https://cag.gov.in
/uploads/download_audit_report/2016/Chapter_2
_of_eAuction_of_Coal_Mines_Compliance_Audit
.pdf.
Ceptureanu, S. I. (2016). Sources and factors in ensuring
the competitive advantage of the company. Quality-
Access to Success, 17(154), 110.
Chandra, R. (2018). Adaptive state capitalism in the
Indian coal industry (Doctoral dissertation, Harvard
University).
Chatterjee, K., &Harrison, T. P. (1988). The value of
information in competitive bidding. European journal
of operational research, 36(3), 322–333.
Che, Y.K. and Gale I.,(1996) ìExpected Revenue of All-
Pay Auctions and FirstPrice Sealed Bid Auctions
with Budget Constraints,îEconomics Letters, 50,
p. 373–379.
Cohn, A., Fehr, E., &Göette, L. (2015). Fair wages and
effort provision: combining evidence from a choice
experiment and a field experiment. Management
Science, 61(8), 1777–1794.
Collis, D. J. (1998). Understanding Sustainable Competitive
Advantage: The Role of Positioning, Resources and
Organisational Capabilities (No. ysm43). Yale School
of Management.
Compiani, G., Haile, P., &Sant’Anna, M. (2020). Common
values, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogenous
entry in US offshore oil lease auctions. Journal of
Political Economy, 128(10), 3872–3912.
Covert, T. R., &Sweeney, R. L. (2023). Relinquishing
Riches: Auctions versus Informal Negotiations in
Texas Oil and Gas Leasing. American Economic
Review, 113(3), 628–663.
Cox, J. C., Dinkin, S. H., &Smith, V. L. (1999). The win-
ner’s curse and public information in common value
auctions: comment. American Economic Review,
89(1), 319–324.
Cramton, P. (2009). Innovation and market
design. Innovation Policy and the Economy, 9(1),
113–137.
Cramton, P. (2010). How best to auction natural resources.
In The taxation of petroleum and minerals (pp. 305–
332). Routledge.
Crémer, J., &McLean, R. P. (1988). Full extraction of
the surplus in Bayesian and dominant strategy auc-
tions. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society, 1247–1257.
Croasmun, J. T., &Ostrom, L. (2011). Using likert-type
scales in the social sciences. Journal of adult educa-
tion, 40(1), 19–22.