15
and 2 that Value and Competitive Intensity influence the
Bid amount as the results show statistically significant posi-
tive effects they have on Bid amount. The observations are
slightly different when we examine the Excess Bids as the
outcomes of the coal block auctions in the Base Model.
These suggest that competitive intensity does influence the
Excess Bid in statistically significant manner, but the Value
variable does not appear to influence Excess Bids in a sta-
tistically significant manner. This results is also consistent
with literature that in common value auctions, it is usually
the competitive intensity that causes higher bids, which in
our study is computed as higher than the prevailing market
price of equivalent grade of coal from CIL. Thus, for Excess
Bid as the dependent variable, we reject the hypothesis 1
but we fail to reject hypothesis 2.
The results from tests on Moderator Model provide
indications that are consistent with some studies and do
not conform to the results from several others. The evi-
dence from our study of coal block auctions in India indi-
cates that competitive intensity does not have a statistically
significant moderating effect on the relationship of Value
variable with either Bid amount or Excess Bid. This pro-
vides us with the interpretation that degree of competition
in coal block auctions have not altered the degree or direc-
tion of effect common values have on Bid amount or Excess
Bid. Thus, we reject hypothesis 3.
The results from tests on Mediator Model provide
indications that are also consistent with some studies and
do not conform to the results from several others. The
evidence from our study of coal block auctions in India
indicates when the outcome of Bid amounts is examined,
Value variable only has statistically significant direct effect
but no statistically significant indirect effect. Thus, while
Value variable has statistically significant total effect on Bid
amounts, there is o mediation effect through competitive
intensity. But when Excess Bid as the outcome is examined
for mediation effect, we observe that Value variable has no
statistically significant direct, indirect or total effect. This
also confirms the results from the Base Model that shows
that Value variable has no statistically significant effect on
Excess Bid. Thus, while the mechanisms for Bid amount
and Excess Bid as auction outcomes differ in their examina-
tion for mediation effect, the conclusion about the hypoth-
esis is the same, we reject hypothesis 4.
We present the results and conclusions about the
hypotheses in a summary in the following table (Table 7).
This provides the conclusions drawn from results from
the tests of Base Model, Moderator Model and Mediator
Model about the proposed hypotheses.
Thus, our study does provide evidence of competitive
intensity effecting the bidding outcomes in coal block auc-
tions in India. When exploring the mechanism of effect,
the results of our study indicate to lack of evidence to sup-
port the moderating or mediating effect of competitive
intensity on bidding outcomes in coal block auctions that
have components of common and private values.
Table 7. Summary of Conclusion from Results of various Models
Dependent Variable → Bid Amount Excess Bid Conclusion
Hypothesis 1: Common value of coal blocks
influence the bid amounts and excess bids that
bidders offer to acquire their mineral rights
Fail to reject Rejected We observe that Value variable has
statistically significant effect on Bid
amount but not on Excess Bid.
Hypothesis 2: Competitive intensity for coal block
on offer influence the bid amounts and excess bids
that bidders offer to acquire their mineral rights
Fail to reject Fail to reject We observe that competitive
intensity has statistically significant
effect on both Bid amount and
Excess Bid.
Hypothesis 3: Competitive intensity for coal
block on offer influences the relationship between
common value of coal block on offer and bid
amounts (and excess bids) that bidders offer to
acquire their mineral rights
Rejected Rejected We observe no statistically
significant moderation effect
of competitive intensity on the
relationship of Value variable with
either Bid amount or Excess Bids.
Hypothesis 4: Competitive intensity for coal block
on offer mediates the relationship between common
value of coal block on offer and bid amounts (and
excess bids) that bidders offer to acquire their
mineral rights
Rejected Rejected We observe no statistically
significant mediation effect of
competitive intensity on the
relationship of Value variable with
either Bid amount or Excess Bids.
and 2 that Value and Competitive Intensity influence the
Bid amount as the results show statistically significant posi-
tive effects they have on Bid amount. The observations are
slightly different when we examine the Excess Bids as the
outcomes of the coal block auctions in the Base Model.
These suggest that competitive intensity does influence the
Excess Bid in statistically significant manner, but the Value
variable does not appear to influence Excess Bids in a sta-
tistically significant manner. This results is also consistent
with literature that in common value auctions, it is usually
the competitive intensity that causes higher bids, which in
our study is computed as higher than the prevailing market
price of equivalent grade of coal from CIL. Thus, for Excess
Bid as the dependent variable, we reject the hypothesis 1
but we fail to reject hypothesis 2.
The results from tests on Moderator Model provide
indications that are consistent with some studies and do
not conform to the results from several others. The evi-
dence from our study of coal block auctions in India indi-
cates that competitive intensity does not have a statistically
significant moderating effect on the relationship of Value
variable with either Bid amount or Excess Bid. This pro-
vides us with the interpretation that degree of competition
in coal block auctions have not altered the degree or direc-
tion of effect common values have on Bid amount or Excess
Bid. Thus, we reject hypothesis 3.
The results from tests on Mediator Model provide
indications that are also consistent with some studies and
do not conform to the results from several others. The
evidence from our study of coal block auctions in India
indicates when the outcome of Bid amounts is examined,
Value variable only has statistically significant direct effect
but no statistically significant indirect effect. Thus, while
Value variable has statistically significant total effect on Bid
amounts, there is o mediation effect through competitive
intensity. But when Excess Bid as the outcome is examined
for mediation effect, we observe that Value variable has no
statistically significant direct, indirect or total effect. This
also confirms the results from the Base Model that shows
that Value variable has no statistically significant effect on
Excess Bid. Thus, while the mechanisms for Bid amount
and Excess Bid as auction outcomes differ in their examina-
tion for mediation effect, the conclusion about the hypoth-
esis is the same, we reject hypothesis 4.
We present the results and conclusions about the
hypotheses in a summary in the following table (Table 7).
This provides the conclusions drawn from results from
the tests of Base Model, Moderator Model and Mediator
Model about the proposed hypotheses.
Thus, our study does provide evidence of competitive
intensity effecting the bidding outcomes in coal block auc-
tions in India. When exploring the mechanism of effect,
the results of our study indicate to lack of evidence to sup-
port the moderating or mediating effect of competitive
intensity on bidding outcomes in coal block auctions that
have components of common and private values.
Table 7. Summary of Conclusion from Results of various Models
Dependent Variable → Bid Amount Excess Bid Conclusion
Hypothesis 1: Common value of coal blocks
influence the bid amounts and excess bids that
bidders offer to acquire their mineral rights
Fail to reject Rejected We observe that Value variable has
statistically significant effect on Bid
amount but not on Excess Bid.
Hypothesis 2: Competitive intensity for coal block
on offer influence the bid amounts and excess bids
that bidders offer to acquire their mineral rights
Fail to reject Fail to reject We observe that competitive
intensity has statistically significant
effect on both Bid amount and
Excess Bid.
Hypothesis 3: Competitive intensity for coal
block on offer influences the relationship between
common value of coal block on offer and bid
amounts (and excess bids) that bidders offer to
acquire their mineral rights
Rejected Rejected We observe no statistically
significant moderation effect
of competitive intensity on the
relationship of Value variable with
either Bid amount or Excess Bids.
Hypothesis 4: Competitive intensity for coal block
on offer mediates the relationship between common
value of coal block on offer and bid amounts (and
excess bids) that bidders offer to acquire their
mineral rights
Rejected Rejected We observe no statistically
significant mediation effect of
competitive intensity on the
relationship of Value variable with
either Bid amount or Excess Bids.