17
DeBrock, L. M., &Smith, J. L. (1983). Joint bidding,
information pooling, and the performance of petro-
leum lease auctions. The Bell Journal of Economics,
395–404.
Dipu, D. (2022). Evaluating coal block auctions.
In Innovative Exploration Methods for Minerals,
Oil, Gas, and Groundwater for Sustainable
Development (pp. 483–492). Elsevier.
Down to Earth (2015). Coal auction, https://www
.d o w n t o e a r t h .o r g .i n /n e w s /m i n i n g /
coal-auction-49918.
Fabbris, L. (2012). Measurement scales for scoring or rank-
ing sets of interrelated items. In Survey data collec-
tion and integration (pp. 21–43). Berlin, Heidelberg:
Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Fichtl, M., Oberlechner, M., &Bichler, M. (2022).
Computing Distributional Bayes Nash Equilibria in
Auction Games via Gradient Dynamics. In AAAI-
22 Workshop on Reinforcement Learning in Games
(AAAI-RLG 22).
Foss, N. J. (2005). Strategy, economic organization, and
the knowledge economy: the coordination of firms and
resources. OUP Oxford.
Frankel, J. A. (2010). The natural resource curse: a sur-
vey (No. w15836). National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Garewal, K. S. (1978). Dimensions of welfare in coal indus-
try. Vikalpa, 3(3), 173–178.
Gavious A., Moldovanu B. and A. Sela, (2003), “Bid
Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 33(4), 709–722.
Gerard, D. (2001). Transaction costs and the value of min-
ing claims. Land Economics, 77(3), 371–384.
Gerding, E. H., Rogers, A., Dash, R. K., &Jennings,
N. R. (2006, May). Competing sellers in online
markets: Reserve prices, shill bidding, and auction
fees. In Proceedings of the fifth international joint
conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent
systems (pp. 1208–1210).
Ghosh, S., Chatterjee, R., &Shanker, P. (2016). Prediction
of coal proximate parameters and useful heat value of
coal from well logs of the Bishrampur coalfield, India,
using regression and artificial neural network model-
ing. Energy &Fuels, 30(9), 7055–7064.
Gibbons, R. (1997). An introduction to applicable game
theory. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(1),
127–149.
Giliberto, S. M. and Varaiya, N. P. (1989). The winner’s
curse and bidder competition in acquisitions: evidence
from failed bank auctions. The Journal of Finance,
44(1), 59–75.
Gliem, J. A., &Gliem, R. R. (2003). Calculating, inter-
preting, and reporting Cronbach’s alpha reliability
coefficient for Likert-type scales. Midwest Research-
to-Practice Conference in Adult, Continuing, and
Community Education.
Greenwald, A., Li, J., &Sodomka, E. (2012). Approximating
equilibria in sequential auctions with incomplete infor-
mation and multi-unit demand. Advances in neural
information processing systems, 25.
Haimanko, O. (2021). Bayesian Nash equilibrium exis-
tence in (almost continuous) contests. Economic
Theory, 71(3), 1231–1258.
Hajkowicz, S. (2009). The evolution of Australia’s natural
resource management programs: Towards improved
targeting and evaluation of investments. Land Use
Policy, 26(2), 471–478.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1968). Games with incomplete informa-
tion played by “Bayesian” players part II. Bayesian equi-
librium points. Management Science, 14(5), 320–334.
Hendricks, K., &Porter, R. H. (2007). An empirical
perspective on auctions. Handbook of Industrial
Organization, 3, 2073–2143.
Hendricks, K., Porter, R., &Tan, G. (2008). Bidding
rings and the winner’s curse. The RAND Journal of
Economics, 39(4), 1018–1041.
Heo, M., Kim, N., &Faith, M. S. (2015). Statistical power
as a function of Cronbach alpha of instrument ques-
tionnaire items. BMC medical research methodol-
ogy, 15(1), 1–9.
Hernando-Veciana, A. (2005). Competition among
auctioneers in large markets. Journal of Economic
Theory, 121(1), 107–127.
Higashida, K., Morita, T., Managi, S., &Takarada, Y.
(2013). Does the Acquisition of Mines by Firms in
Resource-importing Countries Decrease Resource
Prices?. Research Institute of Economy, Trade and
Industry (RIETI).
Hoffman, E., &Marsden, J. R. (1986). Testing informa-
tional assumptions in common value bidding mod-
els. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 627–641.
Hoffman, E., Marsden, J. R., &Saidi, R. (1991). Are joint
bidding and competitive common value auction mar-
kets compatible?—Some evidence from offshore oil
auctions. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 20(2), 99–112.
Holenstein, R. (2005). Using sampling to compute bayes-
nash equilibrium in auction games. CPSC 532A
DeBrock, L. M., &Smith, J. L. (1983). Joint bidding,
information pooling, and the performance of petro-
leum lease auctions. The Bell Journal of Economics,
395–404.
Dipu, D. (2022). Evaluating coal block auctions.
In Innovative Exploration Methods for Minerals,
Oil, Gas, and Groundwater for Sustainable
Development (pp. 483–492). Elsevier.
Down to Earth (2015). Coal auction, https://www
.d o w n t o e a r t h .o r g .i n /n e w s /m i n i n g /
coal-auction-49918.
Fabbris, L. (2012). Measurement scales for scoring or rank-
ing sets of interrelated items. In Survey data collec-
tion and integration (pp. 21–43). Berlin, Heidelberg:
Springer Berlin Heidelberg.
Fichtl, M., Oberlechner, M., &Bichler, M. (2022).
Computing Distributional Bayes Nash Equilibria in
Auction Games via Gradient Dynamics. In AAAI-
22 Workshop on Reinforcement Learning in Games
(AAAI-RLG 22).
Foss, N. J. (2005). Strategy, economic organization, and
the knowledge economy: the coordination of firms and
resources. OUP Oxford.
Frankel, J. A. (2010). The natural resource curse: a sur-
vey (No. w15836). National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Garewal, K. S. (1978). Dimensions of welfare in coal indus-
try. Vikalpa, 3(3), 173–178.
Gavious A., Moldovanu B. and A. Sela, (2003), “Bid
Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps,” Rand Journal of
Economics, 33(4), 709–722.
Gerard, D. (2001). Transaction costs and the value of min-
ing claims. Land Economics, 77(3), 371–384.
Gerding, E. H., Rogers, A., Dash, R. K., &Jennings,
N. R. (2006, May). Competing sellers in online
markets: Reserve prices, shill bidding, and auction
fees. In Proceedings of the fifth international joint
conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent
systems (pp. 1208–1210).
Ghosh, S., Chatterjee, R., &Shanker, P. (2016). Prediction
of coal proximate parameters and useful heat value of
coal from well logs of the Bishrampur coalfield, India,
using regression and artificial neural network model-
ing. Energy &Fuels, 30(9), 7055–7064.
Gibbons, R. (1997). An introduction to applicable game
theory. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(1),
127–149.
Giliberto, S. M. and Varaiya, N. P. (1989). The winner’s
curse and bidder competition in acquisitions: evidence
from failed bank auctions. The Journal of Finance,
44(1), 59–75.
Gliem, J. A., &Gliem, R. R. (2003). Calculating, inter-
preting, and reporting Cronbach’s alpha reliability
coefficient for Likert-type scales. Midwest Research-
to-Practice Conference in Adult, Continuing, and
Community Education.
Greenwald, A., Li, J., &Sodomka, E. (2012). Approximating
equilibria in sequential auctions with incomplete infor-
mation and multi-unit demand. Advances in neural
information processing systems, 25.
Haimanko, O. (2021). Bayesian Nash equilibrium exis-
tence in (almost continuous) contests. Economic
Theory, 71(3), 1231–1258.
Hajkowicz, S. (2009). The evolution of Australia’s natural
resource management programs: Towards improved
targeting and evaluation of investments. Land Use
Policy, 26(2), 471–478.
Harsanyi, J. C. (1968). Games with incomplete informa-
tion played by “Bayesian” players part II. Bayesian equi-
librium points. Management Science, 14(5), 320–334.
Hendricks, K., &Porter, R. H. (2007). An empirical
perspective on auctions. Handbook of Industrial
Organization, 3, 2073–2143.
Hendricks, K., Porter, R., &Tan, G. (2008). Bidding
rings and the winner’s curse. The RAND Journal of
Economics, 39(4), 1018–1041.
Heo, M., Kim, N., &Faith, M. S. (2015). Statistical power
as a function of Cronbach alpha of instrument ques-
tionnaire items. BMC medical research methodol-
ogy, 15(1), 1–9.
Hernando-Veciana, A. (2005). Competition among
auctioneers in large markets. Journal of Economic
Theory, 121(1), 107–127.
Higashida, K., Morita, T., Managi, S., &Takarada, Y.
(2013). Does the Acquisition of Mines by Firms in
Resource-importing Countries Decrease Resource
Prices?. Research Institute of Economy, Trade and
Industry (RIETI).
Hoffman, E., &Marsden, J. R. (1986). Testing informa-
tional assumptions in common value bidding mod-
els. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 627–641.
Hoffman, E., Marsden, J. R., &Saidi, R. (1991). Are joint
bidding and competitive common value auction mar-
kets compatible?—Some evidence from offshore oil
auctions. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 20(2), 99–112.
Holenstein, R. (2005). Using sampling to compute bayes-
nash equilibrium in auction games. CPSC 532A