19
Miller, D. (2019). The resource-based view of the firm.
In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Business and
Management.
MOC (2023). Annual Report – 2022–23, Ministry
of Coal, Government of India, https://coal.gov
.in/en/public-information/reports/annual-reports
/annual-report-2022-23.
Mohamad, N. (2018), India’s Reverse Auction For Coal
Has Done Little For Consumers, A Lot For Private
Power Players, The Wire, https://thewire.in/energy/
indias-reverse-auction-coal-done-little-consumers-lot-
private-power-players#:~:text=When%20coal%20
minister%20Piyush%20Goyal,benefit%20of%20
low%20coal%20prices.
Monica, R. S. (2008, July). Exploring the extension of item
response theory models to the economic and social mea-
surement. In Proceedings of the 12th WSEAS interna-
tional conference on Computers (pp. 247–251).
MSTC (2023). Brief Description of Mines, Mine
Summaries of Coal Mines, MSTC E-Auction,
MSTC Limited, https://www.mstcecommerce.com
/auctionhome/container.jsp?title_id=Mine
%2 0 Su m m a r y %2 0 o f %2 0 C o a l %2 0 M i n e s
&linkid=0&main_link=y&sublink=n&main_link
_name=383&portal=coalblock&homepage=index&
arcDate=03-11-2022.
Müller, D., &Schmitz, P. W. (2016). Transaction costs
and the property rights approach to the theory of the
firm. European Economic Review, 87, 92–107.
Nominated Authority (2020). Standard [Coal/Lignite
Mine Development And Production Agreement /
Coal/Lignite Block Development And Production
Agreement], Nominated Authority, Ministry of Coal
Government of India New Delhi November 03, 2022.
Oren, M. E., &Williams, A. C. (1975). On competitive
bidding. Operations Research, 23(6), 1072–1079.
Pachauri, R. K. (1999). Living with coal: India’s energy pol-
icy in the 21st century. Journal of International Affairs,
101–115.
Pavelescu, F. M. (2004). Features of the ordinary least
square (OLS) method. Implications for the estimation
methodology. Journal for Economic Forecasting, 1(2),
85–101.
Pelto, C. R. (1971). The statistical structure of bidding
for oil and mineral rights. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 66(335), 456–460.
Perron, P., &Yamamoto, Y. (2016). On the usefulness or
lack thereof of optimality criteria for structural change
tests. Econometric Reviews, 35(5), 782–844.
Peterson, R. A. (1994). A meta-analysis of Cronbach’s coef-
ficient alpha. Journal of consumer research, 21(2),
381–391.
PwC (2015), Coal block auctions: A win or a winner’s
curse?, PricewaterhouseCoopers Private Limited, P.12,
https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2015
/coal-block-auctions-a-win-or-a-winners-curse-indian
-chamber-of-commerce.pdf.
Reece, D. K. (1978). Competitive bidding for offshore
petroleum leases. The Bell Journal of Economics,
369–384.
Reynolds, D. B. (1999). The mineral economy: how
prices and costs can falsely signal decreasing scar-
city. Ecological Economics, 31(1), 155–166.
Riahi‐Belkaoui, A. (2003). Intellectual capital and firm
performance of US multinational firms: A study of
the resource‐based and stakeholder views. Journal of
Intellectual capital, 4(2), 215–226.
Rodriguez, M. R., &Suslick, S. B. (2009). An over-
view of Brazilian petroleum exploration lease auc-
tions. Terrae, 6(1), 6–20.
Rothkopf, M. H., &Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1992).
Innovative approaches to competitive mineral leas-
ing. Resources and Energy, 14(3), 233–248.
Sahuguet, N. (2006). Caps in asymmetric all-pay auc-
tions with incomplete information. Economics
Bulletin, 3(9), 1–8.
Saidi, R., &Marsden, J. R. (1992). Number of bids, num-
ber of bidders and bidding behavior in outer-continen-
tal shelf oil lease auction markets. European Journal of
Operational Research, 58(3), 335–343.
Sarkar, S. (2021). Auctions, negotiation and winner’s
curse in coal mining in India. International Journal of
Management Practice, 14(1), 35–48.
Schmitz, H. (2005). Value chain analysis for policy-makers
and practitioners. International Labour Organization.
Sen, R. (2013). Combating Corruption: The Role Of
The CAG In India. Accountable Governance for
Development-Setting an Agenda Beyond 2015, 381.
Sharma, S., &Sud, M. (2019). Impact of regulatory frame-
work on bidding behavior of firms: Policy implications
for the oil &gas sector. Energy policy, 131, 33–42.
Sijtsma, K. (2009). On the use, the misuse, and the very lim-
ited usefulness of Cronbach’s alpha. Psychometrika, 74,
107–120.
Simon, H. A. (1976). From substantive to procedural ratio-
nality. In 25 years of economic theory: Retrospect and
prospect (pp. 65–86). Boston, MA: Springer US.
Sinha, P. (2010). An econometric analysis of skewed produc-
tivity outcomes. Empirical Economics, 38, 347–360.
Miller, D. (2019). The resource-based view of the firm.
In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Business and
Management.
MOC (2023). Annual Report – 2022–23, Ministry
of Coal, Government of India, https://coal.gov
.in/en/public-information/reports/annual-reports
/annual-report-2022-23.
Mohamad, N. (2018), India’s Reverse Auction For Coal
Has Done Little For Consumers, A Lot For Private
Power Players, The Wire, https://thewire.in/energy/
indias-reverse-auction-coal-done-little-consumers-lot-
private-power-players#:~:text=When%20coal%20
minister%20Piyush%20Goyal,benefit%20of%20
low%20coal%20prices.
Monica, R. S. (2008, July). Exploring the extension of item
response theory models to the economic and social mea-
surement. In Proceedings of the 12th WSEAS interna-
tional conference on Computers (pp. 247–251).
MSTC (2023). Brief Description of Mines, Mine
Summaries of Coal Mines, MSTC E-Auction,
MSTC Limited, https://www.mstcecommerce.com
/auctionhome/container.jsp?title_id=Mine
%2 0 Su m m a r y %2 0 o f %2 0 C o a l %2 0 M i n e s
&linkid=0&main_link=y&sublink=n&main_link
_name=383&portal=coalblock&homepage=index&
arcDate=03-11-2022.
Müller, D., &Schmitz, P. W. (2016). Transaction costs
and the property rights approach to the theory of the
firm. European Economic Review, 87, 92–107.
Nominated Authority (2020). Standard [Coal/Lignite
Mine Development And Production Agreement /
Coal/Lignite Block Development And Production
Agreement], Nominated Authority, Ministry of Coal
Government of India New Delhi November 03, 2022.
Oren, M. E., &Williams, A. C. (1975). On competitive
bidding. Operations Research, 23(6), 1072–1079.
Pachauri, R. K. (1999). Living with coal: India’s energy pol-
icy in the 21st century. Journal of International Affairs,
101–115.
Pavelescu, F. M. (2004). Features of the ordinary least
square (OLS) method. Implications for the estimation
methodology. Journal for Economic Forecasting, 1(2),
85–101.
Pelto, C. R. (1971). The statistical structure of bidding
for oil and mineral rights. Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 66(335), 456–460.
Perron, P., &Yamamoto, Y. (2016). On the usefulness or
lack thereof of optimality criteria for structural change
tests. Econometric Reviews, 35(5), 782–844.
Peterson, R. A. (1994). A meta-analysis of Cronbach’s coef-
ficient alpha. Journal of consumer research, 21(2),
381–391.
PwC (2015), Coal block auctions: A win or a winner’s
curse?, PricewaterhouseCoopers Private Limited, P.12,
https://www.pwc.in/assets/pdfs/publications/2015
/coal-block-auctions-a-win-or-a-winners-curse-indian
-chamber-of-commerce.pdf.
Reece, D. K. (1978). Competitive bidding for offshore
petroleum leases. The Bell Journal of Economics,
369–384.
Reynolds, D. B. (1999). The mineral economy: how
prices and costs can falsely signal decreasing scar-
city. Ecological Economics, 31(1), 155–166.
Riahi‐Belkaoui, A. (2003). Intellectual capital and firm
performance of US multinational firms: A study of
the resource‐based and stakeholder views. Journal of
Intellectual capital, 4(2), 215–226.
Rodriguez, M. R., &Suslick, S. B. (2009). An over-
view of Brazilian petroleum exploration lease auc-
tions. Terrae, 6(1), 6–20.
Rothkopf, M. H., &Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1992).
Innovative approaches to competitive mineral leas-
ing. Resources and Energy, 14(3), 233–248.
Sahuguet, N. (2006). Caps in asymmetric all-pay auc-
tions with incomplete information. Economics
Bulletin, 3(9), 1–8.
Saidi, R., &Marsden, J. R. (1992). Number of bids, num-
ber of bidders and bidding behavior in outer-continen-
tal shelf oil lease auction markets. European Journal of
Operational Research, 58(3), 335–343.
Sarkar, S. (2021). Auctions, negotiation and winner’s
curse in coal mining in India. International Journal of
Management Practice, 14(1), 35–48.
Schmitz, H. (2005). Value chain analysis for policy-makers
and practitioners. International Labour Organization.
Sen, R. (2013). Combating Corruption: The Role Of
The CAG In India. Accountable Governance for
Development-Setting an Agenda Beyond 2015, 381.
Sharma, S., &Sud, M. (2019). Impact of regulatory frame-
work on bidding behavior of firms: Policy implications
for the oil &gas sector. Energy policy, 131, 33–42.
Sijtsma, K. (2009). On the use, the misuse, and the very lim-
ited usefulness of Cronbach’s alpha. Psychometrika, 74,
107–120.
Simon, H. A. (1976). From substantive to procedural ratio-
nality. In 25 years of economic theory: Retrospect and
prospect (pp. 65–86). Boston, MA: Springer US.
Sinha, P. (2010). An econometric analysis of skewed produc-
tivity outcomes. Empirical Economics, 38, 347–360.